Toward a theory of legislative rules changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich's evidence

Eric Schickler and Andrew Rich (henceforth S and R) provide a valuable review of attempts to change selected rules of the United States House of Representatives, interpreting their findings against the backdrop of two theoretical approaches-one that emphasizes the role of the majority party in structuring House decisions (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994), and one that emphasizes the importance of cross-party alliances, hence of the House as a whole, in setting the structure of decision-making.(1) They view their findings as partly supporting the partisan mc,del but stress that ''changes in House rules are likely to occur when the balance of forces on the floor changes, even if the majority party caucus median remains unchanged'' (1997, 1342). In this response we indicate how we differ both in our understanding of the partisan model and (relatedly) in our interpretation of the evidence.