Equilibrium dominance in experimental financial markets

被引：13

作者：

Cadsby, CB ^{[1
]}

Frank, M

Maksimovic, V

机构：

[1] Univ Guelph, Dept Econ, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada

[2] Univ British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V5Z 1M9, Canada

[3] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

[4] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 1998年 / 11卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/11.1.189

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine the predictive power of equilibrium dominance in experimental markets where firms with investment opportunities have an informational advantage over potential investors and are permitted to purchase a money-burning signal. Equilibrium dominance often fails to predict well when a Pareto-superior sequential equilibrium is also available. Instead equilibrium selection appears to be related to the potential earnings of a more valuable firm that can signal its type successfully by defecting from the sequential equilibrium Potential investors formulate their bins for firm equity, based primarily on expectations formed adaptively in response to signaling choices made by firms.

引用

页码：189 / 232

页数：44

共 32 条

[1] SIGNALING BY UNDERPRICING IN THE IPO MARKET [J].