AGENCY THEORY AND THE MOTIVATIONAL EFFECT OF MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION - AN EXPERIMENTAL CONTINGENCY STUDY

被引：24

作者：

KOSNIK, RD ^{[1
]}

BETTENHAUSEN, KL ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV COLORADO,MANAGEMENT,DENVER,CO 80202

来源：

GROUP & ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT | 1992年 / 17卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1177/1059601192173009

中图分类号：

B849 [应用心理学];

学科分类号：

040203 ;

摘要：

Agency research has concluded that executive compensation through fixed salary promotes managerial opportunism, whereas equity ownership promotes managers' compliance with stockholders' interests. Using an experimental design, this study examined the extent to which these motivational effects of compensation are conditioned by the level of board control and conditions in the managerial labor market. Participants' opportunistic behavior was negatively affected by the level of board control. This effect was reinforced by high fixed salary compensation and favorable conditions in the managerial labor market.

引用

页码：309 / 330

页数：22

共 43 条

[11] EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION, MANAGEMENT TURNOVER, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE - AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION [J].