MECHANISM DESIGN WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - A SOLUTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM

被引：50

作者：

PALFREY, TR ^{[1
]}

SRIVASTAVA, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV,PITTSBURGH,PA 15213

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 1989年 / 97卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/261621

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：668 / 691

页数：24

共 30 条

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