AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE

[21] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[22] HOLMSTROM B, 1982, ESSAYS EC MANAGEMENT, P209

[23] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252

[24] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[25] Mautz R. K., 1961, PHILOS AUDITING

[26] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312

[27] MOOKHERJEE D, 1982, OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SC

[28] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (01) : 61 - 73

[29] NG DS, 1979, J ACCOUNTING RES S, V17, P1, DOI DOI 10.2307/2490604

[30] NICHOLS DR, 1976, ACCOUNT REV, V51, P335

[21] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[22] HOLMSTROM B, 1982, ESSAYS EC MANAGEMENT, P209

[23] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252

[24] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[25] Mautz R. K., 1961, PHILOS AUDITING

[26] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312

[27] MOOKHERJEE D, 1982, OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SC

[28] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (01) : 61 - 73

[29] NG DS, 1979, J ACCOUNTING RES S, V17, P1, DOI DOI 10.2307/2490604

[30] NICHOLS DR, 1976, ACCOUNT REV, V51, P335