EVOLUTION AND STRATEGIC STABILITY - FROM SMITH,MAYNARD TO KOHLBERG AND MERTENS

被引：21

作者：

SWINKELS, JM

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(92)90039-K

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：333 / 342

页数：10

共 8 条

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MATSUI, A .

[4] ON THE DEFINITION OF THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA [J].

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[5] ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA [J].

KOHLBERG, E ;

MERTENS, JF .

[6]

Maynard Smith J., 1982, pi

[7] EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY WITH EQUILIBRIUM ENTRANTS [J].

SWINKELS, JM .

[8]

VANDAMME E, 1987, STABILIT PERFECTION