COMPUTING SIMPLY STABLE EQUILIBRIA

被引：20

作者：

WILSON, R

机构：

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1992年 / 60卷 / 05期

关键词：

EQUILIBRIUM; STABILITY; ALGORITHM; LINEAR COMPLEMENTARITY;

D O I：

10.2307/2951538

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

For each two-player game, a linear-programming algorithm finds a component of the Nash equilibria and a subset of its perfect equilibria that are simply stable: there are nearby equilibria for each nearby game that perturbs one strategy's probability or payoff more than others.

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收藏

页码：1039 / 1070

页数：32

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