EX-POST INFORMATION IN AUCTIONS

[1] BIKHCHANDANI S, 1988, CHARACTERIZATION EQU

[2] OPTIMAL SELLING STRATEGIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY FOR A DISCRIMINATING MONOPOLIST WHEN DEMANDS ARE INTERDEPENDENT [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (02) : 345 - 361

[3] DUNFORD N, 1957, LINEAR OPERATIONS 1

[4] COLLUSIVE BIDDER BEHAVIOR AT SINGLE-OBJECT 2ND-PRICE AND ENGLISH AUCTIONS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1987, 95 (06) : 1217 - 1239

[5] OPTIMAL AUCTIONS WITH RISK AVERSE BUYERS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1984, 52 (06) : 1473 - 1518

[6] Maskin E., 1988, EC MISSING MARKETS I

[7] MASKIN ES, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P150

[8] MASKIN ES, 1980, AUCTION DESIGN CORRE

[9] BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (03) : 326 - 338

[10] MILGROM PR, 1982, ECONOMETRICA, V50, P181

[1] BIKHCHANDANI S, 1988, CHARACTERIZATION EQU

[2] OPTIMAL SELLING STRATEGIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY FOR A DISCRIMINATING MONOPOLIST WHEN DEMANDS ARE INTERDEPENDENT [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (02) : 345 - 361

[3] DUNFORD N, 1957, LINEAR OPERATIONS 1

[4] COLLUSIVE BIDDER BEHAVIOR AT SINGLE-OBJECT 2ND-PRICE AND ENGLISH AUCTIONS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1987, 95 (06) : 1217 - 1239

[5] OPTIMAL AUCTIONS WITH RISK AVERSE BUYERS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1984, 52 (06) : 1473 - 1518

[6] Maskin E., 1988, EC MISSING MARKETS I

[7] MASKIN ES, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P150

[8] MASKIN ES, 1980, AUCTION DESIGN CORRE

[9] BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (03) : 326 - 338

[10] MILGROM PR, 1982, ECONOMETRICA, V50, P181