Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations

被引：80

作者：

Cripps, MW ^{[1
]}

Mailath, GJ

Samuelson, L

机构：

[1] Washington Univ, John M Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63130 USA

[2] Univ Penn, Dept Econ, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[3] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2004年 / 72卷 / 02期

关键词：

reputation; imperfect monitoring; repeated games; commitment; Stackelberg types;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00496.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.

引用

页码：407 / 432

页数：26

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