Maximal stable sets of two-player games

被引：11

作者：

Govindan, S ^{[1
]}

Wilson, R

机构：

[1] Univ Western Ontario, Dept Econ, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada

[2] Stanford Univ, Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2002年 / 30卷 / 04期

关键词：

perfect equilibria; stable sets;

D O I：

10.1007/s001820200098

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If a connected component of perfect equilibria of a two-player game contains a stable set as defined by Mertens, then the component is itself stable. Thus the stable sets maximal under inclusion are connected components of perfect equilibria.

引用

页码：557 / 566

页数：10

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