UNIQUE IMPLEMENTATION OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH MANY AGENTS

被引：79

作者：

MA, CT

机构：

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1988年 / 55卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297405

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：555 / 572

页数：18

共 13 条

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[7]

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[8]

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[9] RANK-ORDER CONTRACTS FOR A PRINCIPAL WITH MANY AGENTS [J].

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[10] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES WITH MANY AGENTS [J].

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REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) :433-446

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